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BILLS AND NoTEs-THB MEANING oF "NEXT BusINEss DAY"-Two checks,
payable to the plaintiff, were forwarded to the defendant drawee for payment
on February 13, 1949. After the close of banking hours on February 14, the
defendant telegraphed the presenting bank advising that it would not pay the
checks. The applicable Illinois statute1 allowed banks until the end of the "next
business day" following the day of presentation to decide whether or not they
would pay checks. The plaintiff argued that "husiness" qualified "day" and
that defendant therefore should have indicated its decision within business
hours on the day following the day of presentation, and that since it had not
done so there was an implied acceptance. A summary judgment was entered
in favor of defendant. On appeal, held, affinne·d. The phrase ''business day" is

1 ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 98, §207a. This provision has since been
amended and now provides: " ... the bank may have until midnight of its next business
day after receipt within which to dishonor or refuse payment of such instrument."
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not limited to business hours but contemplates a full twenty-four hour period
other than a Sunday or holiday. Rock Finance Co. 11. Central National Bank of
Sterling, (ill. App. 1950) 89 N.E. (2d) 828.
The phrase "next business day" appears in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments law only in section 194 which provides that if the last day for doing an
act falls on a Sunday or holiday it may be done on the next succeeding business
day. The principal case accepts the distinction here suggested and makes no
attempt to deal with the problem in terms of fractions of days.2 However, the
concept of a ''business day" enters the field of negotiable instruments in more
than this limited aspect. Under both the law merchant and the N.I.L. it is a
general rule· that a check must be presented for payme~t on the business day
next following the day on which the payee received it if he wishes to ·avoid any
loss occasioned by a more retarded presentment.3 This is a judicial construction
of the requirement that a check ~e presented for payment within a reasonable
time after its issue. 4 The day on which presentment is actually made must be
limited to banking hours, for presentment generally cannot be made during other
hours.I' When determining the day on which presentment must be made, the
problem of defining "next business day" becomes more acute. When dealing
with a payee's duty to present, some courts have held that a business day is concluded at the end of regular business hours. Thus where a check is received by
the payee after banking hours it has been held that presentment may be postponed until two days thereafter. 6 The "next business day" rule, according to
these courts, contemplates a prior day on which there was an opportunity to
transact business.7 A few courts take a more absolute view of the requirement
and insist on presentment on the day following the day of issuance. 8 Where
drawee and payee are in the same locale the weight of authority permits the
payee to deposit the check with. his bank for collection so long as that bank
presents it for payment on the following day.9 Where payee and drawee are
This definition is also the one given in 38 Wonns AND PHRASES 455.
Ritchie v. Bradshaw, 5 Cal. 228 (1855); Blair v. Wilson, 28 Gratt (Va.) 165
(1877); Viles v. S. D. Warren Co., 132 Me. 277, 170 A. 501 (1934).
4 N.I.L. §186.
Ii N.I.L. §75 provides: ''Where the instrument is payable at a bank, presentment for
payment must be made during banking hours, unless the person to make payment has no
funds there to meet it at any time during the day, in which case presentment at any hour
before the bank is closed on that day is sufficient."
6 Clark v. Davis, 48 Idaho 214, 281 P. 3 (1929); Federal Land Bank v. Goodman, 17
Ark., 489, 292 S.W. 659 (1927); Zaloom v. Ganin, 72 Misc. 36, 129 N.Y.S. 85 (1911);
Loux v. Fox, 171 Pa. 68, 33 A. 190 (1895).
7 In Bistline v. Benting, 39 Idaho 534, 228 P. 309 (1924), the court said at p. 538:
"Since no deposit or presentment can be made after banking hours, the day the check is
received should not be counted, if it is received after banking hours."
s Missouri P.R. Co., v. H. M. Brown Coal Co., 226 Mo. App. 1038, 48 S.W. (2d)
86 (1932). This case held that a check issued on a holiday must be presented on the day
following the holiday.
9 8 AM.. Jun., Bills and Notes §666 et seq. A few jurisdictions cling to the absolute
requirement of "next business day" even in this area. See Rosenblatt v. Haberman, 8 Mo.
App. 486 (1880); Edminster v. Herpolsheimer, 66 Neb. 94, 92 N.W. 138 (1901); Dorchester v. Merchants National Bank, 106 Tex. 201, 163 S.W. 5 (1914).
2
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distant from each other payee must initiate the process of collection ·on the day
following his receipt of the check.10 These rules illustrate the elasticity of the
"next business day" requirement; this judicially developed elasticity is based on
section 193 of the N.I.L. which permits courts to consider the circumstances
in determining what constitutes a reasonable time for presentment. Thus,
though the phrase "next business day" imports an absolute requirement, courts
have used it as merely a convenient yardstick and are quite willing to extend
or limit its definition in view of particular fact situations, most of which have
received quite thorough exposition by the courts.
·

Richard B. Gushee, S.Ed.

10 See

annotation in 91 A.L.R. 1181 (1934).

